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Abstract 
 
 
    The problem of understanding how stereotypes are formed is still valid today. Our 
approach proposes a multi-disciplinary approach to social psychology literature by 
means of social choice theory familiar to those in welfare economics. According to 
the model we propose, when confronted a trait profile of a fixed society, an individual 
observer aggregates the trait profile into a stereotype through what we call "a 
perception function". Regarding the possibility of prejudice and individual subjectivity, 
we extend our model to subjective majority rules in which individual opinions about 
the representativeness of each subgroup within a society is also encaptured. 
     
     
 
Özetçe 
 
 
Basmakalıpların nasıl oluştuğu sorunsalı günümüzde halen geçerlidir. Bizim 
yaklaşımımız; sosyal psikoloji literatürüne, refah iktisadı çalışanlara yakın bir konu 
olan sosyal seçim kuramı araçları kullanarak, çok-disiplinli bir yaklaşım önerir. 
Önerdiğimiz modele göre, bir gözlemci birey, sabit bir topluluğun belirli bir karakter 
profiline sahip bireyleriyle karşılaştığında, bu profili “algı fonksiyonu” dediğimiz 
metodla bir basmakalıba dönüştürür. Önyargı ihtimalini ve bireysel öznelliği de 
gözönünde bulundurarak; modelimizi, toplumun alt kümelerinin temsiliyet gücü 
hakkındaki bireysel fikirleri de yansıtan, öznel çoğunluk kurallarına genişletiyoruz. 
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Introduction
Stereotyping is a very particular way of categorizing. Individuals do categorize
people regarding their attributes or stereotype them so as to perceive them inter-
nally "consistent" bodies (Judd, Ryan & Park 1991) and as simplied portrays. It
is very common that individuals either subjectively or via social interaction form
stereotypes about groups of people or societies. These stereotypes may be ex ante
beliefs and judgements due to society which the individual attributes himself to.
On the other hand, the stereotype may be formed by individual experiences. Indi-
vidual may confront a group of objects and considering the trait in question, the
individual may form a stereotype as an aggregation of the individual traits in the
society.
The term "stereotype" comes from printing typos. It was rst Lippmann (1922)
who conceptualized the metaphor, calling a stereotype a "picture in our heads"1. A
stereotype,thus, is an overall judgment brought over a given group of objects, such
as Princeton students are smart, French food is deliciousor Muslim women
wear scarf. Understanding the formation of stereotypes is a central question of
social psychology. As Krueger et al. (2003) eloquently discuss, a main strand of
the literature rests on the attribution hypothesis which assumes a direct associ-
ation between traits and groups. Under the attribution hypothesis, an observer
judges a group according to the traits he observes in that group. For example, he
looks at Muslim women; sees that some wear a scarf and some do not; his mental
processing of that observation leads to some kind of a general judgment about
Muslim women such as Muslim women wear scarfor as Muslim women do not
1http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stereotype
1
wear scarf. Of course, bringing no judgment hence avoiding a stereotype is also
possible. According to the attribution hypothesis, a trait which is su¢ ciently
prevalent in a given group is associated with that group. To quote Zawadski
(1948), The popular conception of a group characteristic seems to be a charac-
teristic which is present in the majority of the members of the group. According
to this concept, it is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a group characteristic
to be represented in at least 51 per cent of the members of the group.
The problem of understanding how stereotypes are formed is still valid today.
Our approach proposes a multi-disciplinary approach to social psychology litera-
ture by means of social choice theory. In chapter 1, we shortly review the stereotype
literature in social psychology and overview basics of social choice theory after-
wards. Having visited the preliminaries of both disciplines, we come up, in chapter
2, with our model to understand the stereotype formation in particular cases, e.g.
we neglect the ex ante stereotypes such as inherited or imposed ones. We propose,
then, some reasonable axioms for stereotype formation and then characterize the
rules that satisfy those certain axioms. chapter 2 distinguishes between formation
of stereotypes under perfect information and of those under imperfect information.
By the former, we mean an observer trying to bring an overall judgment about
a society which she can see all the members and hence has complete information
about the trait prole. By imperfect information in chapter 2 we mean a situation
in which the observer is aware of the existence of the members which she cannot
see. In chapter 3, we propose a brief discussion for our model and conclude with
the contribution of our studies with further possible extensions.
2
1 Literature Review
The literature on stereotypes is mainly framed within social psychology. There
has been ongoing research in the discipline both in terms of theoretical basis and
of empirical. The studies on di¤erent types of stereotypes are present; i.e. gender
stereotypes, ethnic stereotypes etc. Since stereotype is "a picture in our heads",
how this picture is formed, is a very hot topic in social psychology. On the other
hand there seems to be few that is directly related to stereotype issue in social
choice theory. Nevertheless the choice theory, we believe, a lot to o¤er in terms of
aggregation traits into a stereotype over a given group of people.
Before we propose our model in the next chapter, we would like to devote the
rst part of this chapter to have a look at the history of the literature in social
psychology. We proceed, then, to the ndings in social choice theory which, at
rst glance, may seem irrelevant, yet reveals herself quite useful for an axiomatic
approach to the problem. Thereafter we propose the choice-theoretic model to
stereotype formation
1.1 Stereotyping and Social Psychology
Stereotypes have been studied since early 20th century. Lippmann (1922) laid
down the theoretical basis for stereotypes and was followed by Katz and Bralys
(1933) empirical works. The latter two developed their checklist paradigm in
which the observers were given a set of traits and asked to associate the traits
with a list of ethnic groups, and the most of the empirical studies today rests on
this paradigm. Regarding the methodology of the stereotype studies, there has
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been two hypothesis that arose: attribution hypothesis and categorization hypoth-
esis. The attribution hypothesis (Krueger, Hasman, Acevedo 2003) suggests that
stereotypes are derived from the typicality of traits that are observed whereas for
categorization hypothesis stereotypes are assumed to be derived by comparing at
least two groups of people. The latter rests on the assumption that a stereotype
over a group of people is formed by comparing the availability or typicality of the
same trait in another group. Krueger (1996) shows in his empirical work that
this assumption which is actually dened as "contrast" (Zawadski 1948) seems
irrelevant. On the other hand attribution hypothesis has found more attention by
most of the researchers which according to Krueger et al (2003) assumes "a simple
associationist process by which people learn and encode the properties of social
groups"
Throughout the next chapter we formalize our model using the attribution
hypothesis as we do investigate stereotypes when the observer confronts only one
group of people. Despite its complex structure, the categorization hypothesis does
not constitute a proper workspace for us as there need not be another group of
people so as to compare the typicality of the trait for the observer. Thus we neglect
the possible e¤ect of comparative trait typicality in stereotyping and lay our work
on the attribution hypothesis. This is how our work can benet from social choice
theory via some aggregation concepts which we mention in the next part.
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1.2 Majority Decision Rule and Social Choice Theory
Our model which we propose in the Chapter 2 benets a lot from social choice
theory particularly from majority decision rule. In 1951, Kenneth J. Arrow ar-
gued that when aggregating individual preferences over a set of alternatives with
at least 3 elements, there cannot be any non-dictatorial aggregation rule which sat-
ises PO and IIA axioms and still gives a transitive and complete order as a social
outcome. It was May (1952) who characterized the majority decision rule when
individuals confront two alternatives. The discourse of the majority decision rule
can be applied to the case where a group of individuals vote for or against a given
nominee. Regarding the anonymous and neutral aggregation rules, Maskin (1995)
shows that, majority remains the best among various types of aggregation rules.
In fact a decision rule (when there are two alternatives) is anonymous, neutral and
monotonic if and only it is simple majority decision rule. This characterization
à la May, despite the critics against the demanding feature of monotonicity, has
been extended to various forms. Among these studies there are di¤erent character-
izations of the majority rules by Campbell and Kelly (2000),Yi (2005), Woeginger
(2003).
Asan and Sanver (2002) characterized majority decision rule by dropping monotonic-
ity and using another two conditions instead. Furthermore they also show in an-
other work (2005) that using Maskin-monotonicity instead of monotonicity charac-
terizes absolute qualied majority rules. The literature in majority decision rules
has, thus, been quite explored and in the next chapter we benet of these ndings
to apply to the behaviour of stereotypes. Since the two alternative world can be
read as admitting a trait or not, we can use the social choice literature when a
5
group of individuals (a society) exhibits a trait prole (a voting prole) and when
aggregation of this prole is read as a stereotype formation.
6
2 Axiomatic Approach
2.1 Modelling A Stereotype through Social Choice Per-
spective: Perception Functions
We propose the following model: Take some group, e.g., Turkish citizens, and a
certain trait, e.g., smoking. Some of the members of the group do and some do
not possess this trait and a judgement such as Turks do smokeis an aggregation
of individual traits into a social one. So we can speak of a perception function
that maps individual traits into a subjective stereotype about the society. More
formally, we have a nite set N of individuals with #N  2, to which we refer
as a group. There is a trait which the members of the group may or may not
possess. We write ti = 1 when i 2 N possesses this trait and ti =  1 otherwise.
We let T = f 1; 1gN stand for the set of trait proles. There is an observer2
who looks at the group which exhibits a trait prole t = (t1; :::; t#N) 2 T . Not
necessarily all members of the group are visible to the observer. We write V  N
for the members of the group that are visible to the observer. An observer who
sees V  N is aware of the existence of the unobserved NnV . On the other hand,
we rule out the possibility of wrong observation, i.e., the trait of every visible
member of the group is observed as it truly is. We let TV = f 1; 1gV stand for
the set of trait proles of the observable members. The observer has a subjective
perception of the group as a function of the trait prole he is able to observe,
which we express through a (subjective) perception function  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g.
2To avoid confusion, we assume that the observer is not a member of the group. Although
this has no e¤ect to our model, belongingness of the observer to the observed group seems to
actually matter, according to our intepretation of Krueger et al. (2003).
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So given any non-empty set V  N of observed members and any prevailing trait
prole t 2 TV of these observed members, we write  V (t) = 1 when the observer
globally perceives the group N as possessing the trait in question. Similarly, we
write  V (t) =  1 when the observer globally perceives the group as not possessing
the trait in question and  V (t) = 0 refers to the observers abstention of reaching a
global perception of the group. We refer to the case V = N as perfect observation
and to V  N as imperfect observation. Under perfect observation, we write  
instead of  N .
What kind of perception functions are used? We approach the problem ax-
iomatically by considering the cases of perfect and imperfect observation sepa-
rately.
2.2 Stereotype Formation Under Perfect Observation
We propose the following model: Take some group, e.g., Turkish citizens, and a
certain trait, e.g., smoking. Some of the members of the group do and some do
not possess this trait and a judgement such as Turks do smokeis an aggregation
of individual traits into a social one. So we can speak of a perception function
that maps individual traits into a subjective stereotype about the society. More
formally, we have a nite set N of individuals with #N  2, to which we refer
as a group. There is a trait which the members of the group may or may not
possess. We write ti = 1 when i 2 N possesses this trait and ti =  1 otherwise.
We let T = f 1; 1gN stand for the set of trait proles. There is an observer3
3To avoid confusion, we assume that the observer is not a member of the group. Although
this has no e¤ect to our model, belongingness of the observer to the observed group seems to
actually matter, according to our intepretation of Krueger et al. (2003).
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who looks at the group which exhibits a trait prole t = (t1; :::; t#N) 2 T . Not
necessarily all members of the group are visible to the observer. We write V  N
for the members of the group that are visible to the observer. An observer who
sees V  N is aware of the existence of the unobserved NnV . On the other hand,
we rule out the possibility of wrong observation, i.e., the trait of every visible
member of the group is observed as it truly is. We let TV = f 1; 1gV stand for
the set of trait proles of the observable members. The observer has a subjective
perception of the group as a function of the trait prole he is able to observe,
which we express through a (subjective) perception function  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g.
So given any non-empty set V  N of observed members and any prevailing trait
prole t 2 TV of these observed members, we write  V (t) = 1 when the observer
globally perceives the group N as possessing the trait in question. Similarly, we
write  V (t) =  1 when the observer globally perceives the group as not possessing
the trait in question and  V (t) = 0 refers to the observers abstention of reaching a
global perception of the group. We refer to the case V = N as perfect observation
and to V  N as imperfect observation. Under perfect observation, we write  
instead of  N .
What kind of perception functions are used? We approach the problem ax-
iomatically by considering the cases of perfect and imperfect observation sepa-
rately.
2.2.1 Axioms for Perception Functions
Being sensitive to individual traits is incorporated in the concept of a perception
function. So, we wish to rule out imposed perceptions that are independent of
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individual traits such as Muslims do not drink alcohol because this is what the
Quran says. Hence we posit that under perfect observation, the observer would
say Muslims do not drink alcohol if no Muslim drinks alcohol and Muslims
do drink alcohol if every Muslim drinks alcohol. We express these through the
following axiom:
Non-imposedness: A perception function  : T ! f1; 0; 1g satises non-
imposedness i¤  (1; 1; :::; 1) = 1 and  ( 1; 1; :::; 1) =  1.
The non-imposedness axiom is a weak unanimity requirement which rules out
imposed perceptions while it does not exclude biased ones such as saying Muslims
eat porkif and only if every Muslim eats pork and saying Muslims do not eat
porkeven when there exists a single Muslim who does not eat pork. It is clear
that such a perception is based on an unequal treatment of traits. Of course this
may happen but when we wish to rule it out, we use the following axiom:
Impartiality: A perception function  : T ! f1; 0; 1g satises impartiality
i¤  ( t) =   (t) 8t 2 T .
Remark that given a trait prole t, the trait prole  t stands for the reversal
of every individual trait. So impartiality is an adaptation of the usual neutrality
condition of social choice theory which ensures the equal treatment of alterna-
tives. An observer with an impartial perception function is not prejudiced about
the groups possessing or not possessing the trait: If the trait of every observed
individual is reversed then so is the perception.
In contrast to what impartiality requires, one can perceive a society under an
unequal treatment of the traits. For example, it is possible that the observer has
a bias towards thinking that the society exhibits the trait in question. Such a bias
is formally expressed through the following axiom:
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Positive Prejudice: We say that a perception function  : T ! f1; 0; 1g
admits positive prejudice i¤
(i) 9 t 2 T such that  (t) = 1 and  ( t) 2 f0; 1g
and
(ii)  (t) 2 f0; 1g =)  ( t) = 1 8t 2 T .
So under a perception function admitting positive prejudice, there is a trait
prole t such that the trait is rejected neither at t nor at  t. Moreover, there
exists no trait prole t such that the observer rejects the trait or is indecisive both
at t and  t .
Similarly, as expressed below, the observer can have a bias towards thinking
that the society does exhibit the trait in question:
Negative Prejudice: We say that a perception function  : T ! f1; 0; 1g
admits negative prejudice i¤
(i) 9 t 2 T such that  (t) =  1 and  ( t) 2 f 1; 0g
and
(ii)  (t) 2 f0; 1g =)  ( t) =  1 8t 2 T
Another axiom we borrow from the social choice literature is a monotonicity
condition: If a trait prole changes so that some individuals who did not possess
the trait now possess it while this is the only change, then the perception should
not change in the opposite direction. We express this formally as follows:
Monotonicity: A perception function  : T ! f1; 0; 1g is monotonic i¤
 (t)   (t0) 8t; t0 2 T with ti  t0i 8i 2 N .
These axioms pave the way to the characterization of a class of perception
functions which we call subjective majority rules. We have three main characteri-
zation results where we use the conjunction of non-imposedness and monotonicity
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with one of impartiality, positive prejudice and negative prejudice.4 We close the
section by establishing the logical independence of the axiom triples that we use.
Proposition 1 Non-imposedness, monotonicity and impartiality are logically in-
dependent.
Proof. To see that impartiality and non-imposedness do not imply monotonicity,
let #N = 3 and consider  : T ! f1; 0; 1g which is dened for each t 2 T as
 (t) = 1 when # fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 f1; 3g and  (t) =  1 otherwise. To see that
impartiality and monotonicity do not imply non-imposedness, take  (t) = 0 for
all t 2 T . Finally, to see that non-imposedness and monotonicity do not imply
impartiality, let  (t) =  1 if ti =  1 8i 2 N and  (t) = 1 otherwise.
Proposition 2 Non-imposedness, monotonicity and positive prejudice are logi-
cally independent.
Proof. To see that positive prejudice and non-imposedness do not imply monotonic-
ity, let#N = 3 and consider  : T ! f1; 0; 1g which is dened as  ( 1; 1; 1) =
 1,  (1; 1; 1) = 0 and  (t) = 1 otherwise. To see that positive prejudice and
monotonicity do not imply non-imposedness, take  (t) = 1 for all t 2 T . Finally,
to see that non-imposedness and monotonicity do not imply positive prejudice, let
 (t) = 1 if ti = 1 8i 2 N and  (t) =  1 otherwise.
Proposition 3 Non-imposedness, monotonicity and negative prejudice are logi-
cally independent.
4Remark that impartiality, positive prejudice and negative prejudice are pairwise logically
incompatible.
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Proof. To see that negative prejudice and non-imposedness do not imply monotonic-
ity, let #N = 3 and consider  : T ! f1; 0; 1g which is dened as  (1; 1; 1) = 1,
 ( 1; 1; 1) = 0 and  (t) =  1 otherwise. To see that negative prejudice and
monotonicity do not imply non-imposedness, take  (t) =  1 for all t 2 T . Finally,
to see that non-imposedness and monotonicity do not imply negative prejudice,
let  (t) =  1 if ti =  1 8i 2 N and  (t) = 1 otherwise.
2.2.2 A Solution: Subjective Majority Rules
We rst dene a (subjective) weight distribution as a mapping ! : 2N ! [0; 1]
such that !(K) + !(NnK) = 1 for all K 2 2N while !(N) = 1. So ! expresses
the subjective opinion of the observer about the representation weight of each
subgroup of N . A weight distribution ! is monotonic i¤ !(K)  !(L) for all
K;L 2 2N with K  L. For the rest of the paper, we embed monotonicity into
the denition of a weight distribution.
Given a weight distribution ! and any q 2 (0; 1), a subjective (!; q) majority
rule is a perception function  !;q : T ! f1; 0; 1g dened for each t 2 T as
follows:
 !;q(t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if !(fi 2 N : ti = 1g) > q
 1 if !(fi 2 N : ti =  1g) > 1  q
0 otherwise
9>>>>=>>>>;
So the observer looks at the group with some subjective opinion about how
representative the subgroups are. If, according to this subjective opinion, the
weight of those who possess the trait exceeds q, then the observer concludes that
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the group globally possesses that trait. Similarly, if the (subjective) weight of
those who possess the trait is below q, then the observer concludes that the group
globally does not possess that trait.5 If neither of these two cases holds then no
conclusion is derived.
Theorem 1 A perception function  : T ! f1; 0; 1g satises non-imposedness,
monotonicity and impartiality i¤  is a subjective (!; 1
2
) majority rule.
Proof. We leave the ifpart to the reader. To see the only ifpart, take any
perception function  : T ! f1; 0; 1g that satises non-imposedness, monotonic-
ity and impartiality. We dene W = fK 2 2N :  (t) = 1 for t 2 T with ti = 1
8i 2 K and ti =  1 8i 2 NnKg and L = fK 2 2N :  (t) =  1 for t 2 T with
ti = 1 8i 2 K and ti =  1 8i 2 NnKg. As  satises non-imposedness, N 2 W 
and ; 2 L , hence W and L are each non-empty. Let O = 2Nn (W [ L ) be
the (possibly empty) set of coalitions which are neither inW nor in L . Now con-
sider a function ! : 2N ! [0; 1] dened for each K 2 2N as ! (K) = 1 if K 2 W ,
! (K) = 0 ifK 2 L and ! (K) = 12 ifK 2 O . As  is impartial, for eachK 2 2N ,
we have K 2 L () NnK 2 W which implies K 2 O () NnK 2 O . Thus
! (K) + ! (NnK) = 1 8K 2 2N while ! (N) = 1. Moreover, the monotonicity
of  implies !(K)  !(L) for all K;L 2 2N with K  L. So ! is a weight dis-
tribution. We complete the proof by showing that the subjective (!; 1
2
) majority
rule  !;
1
2 : T ! f1; 0; 1g coincides with  . To see this, take any t 2 T . If
 (t) = 1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 W , implying ! (K) = 1 > 12 , which
establishes  !;
1
2 (t) = 1. If  (t) =  1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 L , implying
5Remark that !(fi 2 N : ti =  1g) > 1   q and !(fi 2 N : ti = 1g) < q are equivalent
requirements. However, we use the former statement to be coherent with our denition in Section
3, where we consider subjective majority rules under imperfect observation.
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! (K) = 0, hence ! (NnK) = 1 > 1
2
, which establishes  !;
1
2 (t) =  1. If  (t) = 0
then K 2 O , implying ! (K) = 12 , which establishes  !;
1
2 (t) = 0.
Theorem 2 A perception function  : T ! f1; 0; 1g satises non-imposedness,
monotonicity and positive prejudice i¤  is a subjective (!; q) majority rule with
q 2 (0; 1
2
) and !(K) 2 [q; 1  q] for some K 2 2N .
Proof. To see the ifpart, take any subjective (!; q) majority rule  !;q with q 2
(0; 1
2
) and !(K) 2 [q; 1 q] for someK 2 2N . It is straightforward to check that  !;q
satises non-imposedness and monotonicity. To show that  !;q satises positive
prejudice, take some K 2 2N with !(K) 2 (q; 1   q]. Remark that  !;q (t) = 1
and  !;q ( t) 2 f0; 1g for t 2 T with ti = 1 8i 2 K and ti =  1 8i 2 NnK.
Now take any t 2 T with  !;q (t) 2 f0; 1g. Thus, letting K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g,
we have !(K)  q, hence !(NnK) > q, implying  !;q ( t) = 1, showing that
 !;q satises positive prejudice. To see the only if part, take any perception
function  : T ! f1; 0; 1g that satises non-imposedness, monotonicity and
positive prejudice. Let W , L and O be dened as in the proof of Theorem
1. Note that N 2 W and ; 2 L while O may be empty. Now pick some
q 2 (0; 1
2
) and consider a function ! : 2N ! [0; 1] dened for each K 2 2N as
! (K) = 0 if K 2 L , ! (K) = q if K 2 O . Moreover, if K 2 W , then let
! (K) = 1 when NnK 2 L ; ! (K) = 1   q when NnK 2 O and ! (K) = 12
when NnK 2 W . As  satises positive prejudice, for each K 2 L [O we have
NnK 2 W . Thus ! (K) + ! (NnK) = 1 8K 2 2N while ! (N) = 1. Moreover,
the monotonicity of  implies !(K)  !(L) for all K;L 2 2N with K  L. So
! is a weight distribution. Note also that by positive prejudice, 9K 2 W such
that NnK 2 W [ O , implying !(K) 2 [q; 1   q]. We complete the proof by
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showing that the subjective (!; q) majority rule  !;q : T ! f1; 0; 1g coincides
with  . To see this, take any t 2 T . If  (t) = 1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 W 
and ! (K) 2 f1
2
; 1   q; 1g implying ! (K) > q, which establishes  !;q(t) = 1. If
 (t) = 0, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 O and ! (K) = q, which establishes
 !;q(t) = 0. If  (t) =  1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 L and ! (K) = 0, hence
! (NnK) = 1 > 1  q, which establishes  !;q(t) =  1.
Theorem 3 A perception function  : T ! f1; 0; 1g satises non-imposedness,
monotonicity and negative prejudice i¤  is a subjective (!; q) majority rule with
q 2 (1
2
; 1) and ! (K) 2 [1  q; q] for some K 2 2N .
Proof. To see the ifpart, take any subjective (!; q) majority rule  !;q with
q 2 (1
2
; 1) and ! (K) 2 [1   q; q] for some K 2 2N . It is straightforward to
check that  !;q satises non-imposedness and monotonicity. To show that  !;q
satises negative prejudice, take some K 2 2N with ! (K) 2 (1   q; q]. Remark
that  !;q (t) =  1 and  !;q ( t) 2 f 1; 0g for t 2 T with ti =  1 8i 2 K
and ti = 1 8i 2 NnK. Now take any t 2 T with  !;q (t) 2 f0; 1g. Thus, letting
K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g, we have ! (K)  q > 1 q, implying  !;q ( t) =  1 showing
that  !;q satises negative prejudice. To see the only ifpart, take any perception
function  : T ! f1; 0; 1g that satises non-imposedness, monotonicity and
negative prejudice. Let W , L and O be dened as in the proof of Theorem
1. Note that N 2 W and ; 2 L while O may be empty. Now pick some
q 2 (1
2
; 1) and consider a function ! : 2N ! [0; 1] dened for each K 2 2N as
! (K) = 1 if K 2 W , ! (K) = q if K 2 O . Moreover, if K 2 L , then let
! (K) = 0 when NnK 2 W ; ! (K) = 1   q when NnK 2 O and ! (K) = 12
when NnK 2 L . As  satises negative prejudice, for each K 2 W [O we have
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NnK 2 L . Thus ! (K) + ! (NnK) = 1 8K 2 2N while ! (N) = 1. Moreover,
the monotonicity of  implies !(K)  !(L) for all K;L 2 2N with K  L. So
! is a weight distribution. Note that by negative prejudice, 9K 2 L such that
NnK 2 O [ L , implying ! (K) 2 [1  q; q]. We complete the proof by showing
that the subjective (!; q) majority rule  !;q : T ! f1; 0; 1g coincides with  .
To see this, take any t 2 T . If  (t) =  1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 L and
! (K) 2 f0; 1 q; 1
2
g implying ! (K) < q, hence ! (NnK) > 1 q, which establishes
 !;q(t) =  1. If  (t) = 0, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 O and ! (K) = q, which
establishes  !;q(t) = 0. If  (t) = 1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 W and
! (K) = 1 > q, which establishes  !;q(t) =  1.
Remark 1 Monotonicity is a normatively appealing condition for perception func-
tions and this is why we are keeping it throughout our analysis. However, it is
clear from their proofs that Theorems 1, 2 and 3 can be stated by simultaneously
dispensing with the monotonicity of the perception function and the monotonicity
condition incorporated into the denition of a weight distribution.
Until now, we did not bring any requirement for an equal treatment of individ-
uals by the weight distribution !. In fact, at one extreme, it is possible to have an
observer who believes that a group is fully represented in the personality of one
of its members d 2 N which would correspond to a weight distribution !(K) = 1
for all K 2 2N with d 2 K. At the other extreme, we have !=(K) = #K
#N
for
all K 2 2N where all individuals are thought of having equal weight. Given the
subjective nature of weight distributions (hence of stereotype formation), we do
not think that an equal treatment of individuals should be required. However, we
wish to explore the e¤ects of imposing such a requirement. A perception func-
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tion  : T ! f1; 0; 1g is anonymous i¤ given any t = (t1; :::; t#N) 2 T and
any bijection  : N  ! N , we have  (t1; :::; t#N) =  (t(1); :::; t(#N)). Given
some  2 (0; 1), a weight distribution ! : 2N ! [0; 1] is  anonymous i¤ given
any K;L 2 2N with #K = #L we have ! (K) >  () ! (L) >  and
! (K) <  () ! (L) < .6
Theorem 4 A perception function  : T ! f1; 0; 1g satises non-imposedness,
monotonicity, impartiality and anonymity i¤  is a subjective (!; 1
2
) majority rule
for some 1
2
 anonymous !.
Proof. To show the ifpart, let  : T ! f1; 0; 1g be a subjective (!; 1
2
) majority
rule where ! is 1
2
 anonymous. We know by Theorem 1 that  satises non-
imposedness, monotonicity and impartiality. To see the anonymity of  , take
any t = (t1; :::; t#N) 2 T . Let K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g. Take any bijection
 : N  ! N . Let (t) = (t(1); :::; t(#N)) and (K) = f (i)gi2K . As  is
a bijection, #K = #(K). Moreover, fi 2 N : t(i) = 1g = (K). Thus
 (t1; :::; t#N) =  (t(1); :::; t(#N)) holds by the 12 anonymity of !.
To show the only if part, take any  : T ! f1; 0; 1g satisfying non-
imposedness, monotonicity, impartiality and anonymity. We know, by Theorem
1 that  is a subjective (!; 1
2
) majority rule. To see that ! is 1
2
 anonymous,
take any K;L 2 2Nn f;g with #K = #L. Take t = (t1; :::; t#N) 2 T with
fi 2 N : ti = 1g = K. Take also some bijection  : N  ! N such that
f (i)gi2K = L. Now let ! (K) > 12 . So  (t) = 1. As  is anonymous,
 (t(1); :::; t(#N)) = 1 as well, implying !(fi 2 N : t(i) = 1g) = !(L) > 12 .
6Hence we also have ! (K) =  () ! (L) = . Note that -anonymity is weaker than a
more standard anonymity condition which would require !(K) = !(L) for all K;L 2 2N with
#K = #L.
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One can similarly establish that letting ! (K) < 1
2
implies ! (L) < 1
2
, thus showing
the 1
2
 anonymity of !.
Remark 2 The mathematics of our model belongs to the literature on majority
characterizations, which goes back to May (1952). This allows to make a remark
about Theorem 4. Consider a set A = fx; yg of alternatives and let each i 2 N
have a preference pi 2 fxy ; yxg over A.7 Denoting xy for indi¤erence between x and
y, we conceive a social choice rule as a mapping f : fx
y
; y
x
gN ! fx
y
; y
x
; xyg. Let
n be the lowest integer exceeding #N
2
. Picking any  2 fn; :::; ng, we dene a
 majority rule as a social choice rule f : fxy ; yxgN ! fxy ; yx ; xyg where for any
p = (p1; :::; p#N) 2 fxy ; yxg we have f(p) = xy () #fi 2 N : pi = xyg   and
f(p) =
y
x
() #fi 2 N : pi = yxg  .8 Theorem 3.2 of Asan and Sanver
(2006) characterizes the set of Pareto optimal, anonymous, neutral and Maskin
monotonic aggregation rules in terms of  majority rules. In that abstract setting,
Pareto optimality, anonymity and neutrality respectively coincide with our non-
imposedness, anonymity and impartiality. On the other hand Maskin monotonicity
is stronger than our monotonicity. So by Theorem 4, we can deduce that the class of
 majority rules is a subset of the class of subjective (!; 1
2
) majority rules with
! being 1
2
 anonymous. In other words, every aggregation rule that gives every
coalition in the society its objective weight (i.e., letting the weight of K 2 2N
be #K
#N
) but possibly qualies the required majority can alternatively be expressed
by xing majority as usual (i.e., as any coalition whose cardinality exceeds its
complement) but assigning monotonic and 1
2
 anonymous (subjective) weights to
coalitions.
7where xy is interpreted as x being preferred to y and
y
x is interpreted as y being preferred to
x. So individual preferences do not admit indi¤erence between x and y.
8Thus f(p) = xy () #fi 2 N : pi = xy g <  and #fi 2 N : pi = yxg < .
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Remark 3 As is for Theorem 1, Theorems 2 and 3 can be stated by simultaneously
adding anonymity to the perception function and the corresponding  anonymity
with  = q to the weight distribution.
2.3 Stereotype Formation Under Imperfect Observation
In this section we model the behaviour of the perception functions under imperfect
observation. Throughout the section, we x some non-empty set V ( N of visible
group members and consider the perception function  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g. The
existence of invisible group members entails a revision of the non-imposedness
axiom. For, an observer who fails to observe some members of the group may be
cautious to bring a global perception of the group, even when the prevailing trait
prole is unanimous We revisit our axioms from the perfect observation
2.3.1 Axioms for Perception Functions
Non-imposedness: A perception function  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g satises non-
imposedness i¤  V (1; 1; :::; 1) 2 f0; 1g and  V ( 1; 1; :::; 1) 2 f 1; 0g.
Remark that the imperfect information version of non-imposedness is neither
weaker nor stronger than its perfect information version. For, it is weakened by
allowing the refusal of judgements but strengthened by being imposed over the
proles where unanimity is reached among the members of V .
Monotonicity, impartiality, positive prejudice and negative prejudice exhibit
a strengthening of the similar spirit, as we now impose them when the related
changes in the trait proles occur in the visible part of the group.
Monotonicity: A perception function  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g is monotonic i¤
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 V (t)   V (t0) 8 t; t0 2 TV with ti  t0i 8i 2 V .
Impartiality: A perception function  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g satises impartial-
ity i¤  V (t
0) =   V (t) 8t; t0 2 TV such that t0i =  ti 8i 2 V .
Positive Prejudice: We say that a perception function  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g
admits positive prejudice i¤
(i) 9 t 2 TV such that  V (t) = 1 and  V ( t) 2 f0; 1g
and
(ii)  V (t) 2 f 1; 0g =)  V ( t) = 1 8 t 2 TV .
Negative Prejudice: We say that a perception function  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g
admits negative prejudice i¤
(i) 9 t 2 TV such that  V (t) =  1 and  V ( t) 2 f 1; 0g
and
(ii)  V (t) = f0; 1g =)  V ( t) =  1 8 t 2 TV
To characterize perception under imperfect observation, we use the conjunction
of non-imposedness and monotonicity with one of impartiality, positive prejudice
and negative prejudice. The following proposition establishes the logical relation-
ship between these axioms9:
Proposition 4 (i) Monotonicity and impartiality imply non-imposedness.
(ii)Monotonicity and impartiality are logically independent.
(iii)Non-imposedness, monotonicity and positive prejudice are logically inde-
pendent.
(iv)Non-imposedness, monotonicity and negative prejudice are logically inde-
pendent.
9As is in the perfect observation case (see Footnote 2), impartiality, positive prejudice and
negative prejudice are pairwise logically incompatible.
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Proof. Proof of (i): Let  V : TV ! f 1; 0; 1g satisfy impartiality and fail non-
imposedness. We have  V (1; 1; :::1) =  1 or  V ( 1; 1; :::; 1) = 1 by the fail-
ure of non-imposedness which, by impartiality, implies  V (1; 1; :::1) =  1 and
 V ( 1; 1; :::; 1) = 1, contradicting monotonicity.
Proof of (ii): Dene  V : TV ! f 1; 0; 1g as  V (1; 1; :::; 1) =  1,  V ( 1; 1; :::; 1) =
1 and  V (t) = 0 8t 2 TV with ti = 1, tj =  1 for some i; j 2 V . Check that  V
is impartial but not monotonic. Now let  V (t) = 1 8t 2 TV and check that  V is
monotonic but not impartial.
Proof of (iii): To see that non-imposedness and monotonicity do not imply
positive prejudice, let  V (1; 1; :::; 1) = 1 and  V (t) =  1 for any t 2 TV with
ti 2 f 1; 0g for some i 2 V . To see that non-imposedness and positive prejudice
do not imply monotonicity, let #V = 3 and let  V (t) = 1 if # fi 2 V : ti = 1g 2
f1; 3g;  V (t) =  1 if # fi 2 V : ti = 1g = 2 and  V ( 1; 1; 1) = 0. To see that
monotonicity and positive prejudice do not imply non-imposedness let  V (t) = 1
8t 2 TV .
Proof of (iv): To see that non-imposedness and monotonicity do not imply
negative prejudice, let  V ( 1; 1; :::; 1) =  1 and  V (t) = 1 for any t 2 TV with
ti 2 f0; 1g for some i 2 V . To see that non-imposedness and negative prejudice
do not imply monotonicity let #V = 3 and let  V (t) =  1 if # fi 2 V : ti = 1g 2
f0; 2g;  V (1; 1; 1) = 0 and  V (t) = 1 if # fi 2 V : ti = 1g = 1. To see that
monotonicity and negative prejudice do not imply non-imposedness let  V (t) =  1
8t 2 TV .
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2.3.2 Subjective Majority Rules Revisited
A (subjective) weight distribution as an ordered pair  = (!; p) where ! : 2V !
[0; 1] is a mapping satisfying
(i) !(K) + !(V nK) = 1 for all K 2 2V
(ii) !(V ) = 1
(iii) !(K)  !(L) for all K;L 2 2V with K  L
and p 2 [0; 1] reects the weight of V in N .10
Given a weight distribution  = (!; p) and any q 2 (0; 1), a subjective (; q) majority
rule is a perception function  ;qV : TV ! f1; 0; 1g dened for each t 2 TV as
follows:
 ;qV (t) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 if p:!(fi 2 V : ti = 1g) > q
 1 if p:!(fi 2 V : ti =  1g) > 1  q
0 otherwise
9>>>>=>>>>;
So the observer looks at V with some subjective opinion about how representa-
tive its subgroups are. Moreover, he has a subjective opinion about the represen-
tativeness of V within the whole society. If, according to these subjective opinions,
the weight of those who possess the trait exceeds q, then the observer concludes
that the group globally possesses that trait. Similarly, if the (subjective) weight
of those who do not possess the trait exceeds 1   q, then the observer concludes
that the group globally does not possess that trait.11 If neither of these two cases
holds then no conclusion is derived.
10Remark that under perfect observation, we used ! to express the weight distribution within
N but now it expresses the (monotonic) weight distribution within V coupled with the parameter
p which reects the weight of V in N . Of course when p = 1, V can be conceived as the whole
society, bringing us back to the case of perfect observation.
11Remark that p:!(fi 2 V : ti =  1g) > 1   q and p:!(fi 2 V : ti = 1g) < q are equivalent
requirements if and only if p = 1. See Footnote 3.
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Theorem 5 A perception function  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g satises monotonicity
and impartiality i¤  V is a subjective (;
1
2
) majority rule for some subjective
weight distribution  = (!; p).
Proof. We leave the if part to the reader. To see the only if part, take any
 V : TV ! f 1; 0; 1g that satises monotonicity and impartiality. Let W =
fK 2 2V :  V (t) = 1 for t 2 TV with ti = 1 8i 2 K and ti =  1 8i 2 V nKg
and L = fK 2 2V :  V (t) =  1 for t 2 TV with ti = 1 8i 2 K and ti =  1
8i 2 V nKg. We set O = 2V n(W [ L ). Note that the perception function  V
dened as  V (t) = 0 at each t 2 TV is monotonic and impartial. SoW and L can
both be empty. However, by the impartiality of  V , we have W = ; () L = ;.
In fact, W = ; () L = ; ()  V (t) = 0 8t 2 TV . First consider the case
where W = ; and L = ;. So  V (t) = 0 8t 2 TV . Take any subjective weight
distribution  = (!; p) with p 2 [0; 1
2
). It is straightforward to check that the
subjective (; 1
2
) majority rule coincides with  V . Now consider the case where
neither W nor L is empty. Thus, V 2 W and ; 2 L . Consider the function
! : 2V ! [0; 1] where ! (K) = 1 8K 2 W , ! (K) = 0 8K 2 L and ! (K) = 12
8K 2 O . The impartiality of  V ensures K 2 W () V nK 2 L 8K 2 2V and
thus K 2 O () V nK 2 O 8K 2 2V . Hence ! (K) + ! (V nK) = 1 8K 2 2V
while ! (V ) = 1. Moreover, the monotonicity of  V implies !(K)  !(L) for all
K;L 2 2V withK  L. Thus, any p 2 [0; 1] induces a subjective weight distribution
(!; p). Pick p = 1 and let  = (!; 1). We claim that the subjective (; 1
2
) majority
rule  
; 1
2
V : TV ! f 1; 0; 1g coincides with  V . To see this, take any t 2 TV . If
 V (t) = 1, then K = fi 2 V : ti = 1g 2 W and ! (K) = 1, implying p:! (K) =
1 > 1
2
, which establishes  
; 1
2
V (t) = 1. If  V (t) =  1, then K = fi 2 V : ti = 1g 2
L and ! (K) = 0, hence ! (V nK) = 1, implying p:! (V nK) = 1 > 12 , which
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establishes  
; 1
2
V (t) =  1. If  V (t) = 0, then K = fi 2 V : ti = 1g 2 O and
! (K) = 1
2
, hence ! (V nK) = 1
2
. Thus neither p:! (K) > 1
2
, nor p:! (V nK) > 1
2
holds, which establishes  
; 1
2
V (t) = 0.
Theorem 6 Given any V ( N , a perception function  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g satis-
es weak non-imposedness, monotonicity and positive prejudice i¤  V is a subjec-
tive (; q) majority rule with q 2 (0; 1
2
) while  = (!; p) is a weight distribution
such that p > max f2q; 1  qg and ! (K) 2 [ q
p
; 1 q
p
] for some K 2 2V .12
Proof. To see the ifpart, let  V be a subjective (; q) majority rule as in the
statement of the theorem. It is straightforward to check  ;qV satises weak non-
imposedness and monotonicity. To show that  ;qV satises positive prejudice, take
some K 2 2V with ! (K) 2 ( q
p
; 1 q
p
]. So  ;qV (t) = 1 for t 2 TV with ti = 1 8i 2 K
and ti =  1 8i 2 V nK. Moreover, as p:! (K)  1  q, we have  ;qV ( t) 2 f0; 1g.
Now take any t 2 TV with  ;qV (t) 2 f 1; 0g and let K = fi 2 V : ti = 1g. If
 ;qV (t) =  1 then p:! (V nK) > 1   q > q, implying  V ( t) = 1. If  ;qV (t) = 0
then p:! (K)  q. As p > 2q, we have ! (K) < 1
2
, thus ! (V nK) > 1
2
and
p:! (V nK) > 2q, implying  V ( t) = 1 which shows that  ;qV satises positive
prejudice. To see the only if part, take any  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g that satises
weak non-imposedness, monotonicity and positive prejudice. We dene W , O 
and L as in Theorem 5. Note that V 2 W . Moreover, while one of O and
L may be empty, O [ L is non-empty. Now pick some q 2 (0; 12) and consider
the function ! : 2V ! [0; 1] dened for each K 2 2V as ! (K) = ! (V nK) = 1
2
when K, V nK 2 W ; ! (K) = 0 and ! (V nK) = 1 when K 2 L and V nK 2
W ; ! (K) = q and ! (V nK) = 1   q when K 2 O and V nK 2 W . Note
12Note that p > max f2q; 1  qg ensures qp , 1 qp 2 (0; 1). Moreover, q 2 (0; 12 ) ensures qp < 1 qp .
25
that positive prejudice ensures K 2 L [ O =) V nK 2 W for each K 2 2V .
Thus !(K) +!(V nK) = 1 8K 2 2V with !(V ) = 1, while the monotonicity of  V
implies !(K)  !(L) for all K;L 2 2V with K  L. Thus, any p 2 [0; 1] induces a
subjective weight distribution (!; p). Take any p 2 [0; 1] with p > maxf2q; 1  qg.
We will show that ! (K) 2 [ q
p
; 1 q
p
] for some K 2 2V . Recall that O [ L is
non-empty. First let O be non-empty and take some S 2 O . So V nS 2 O and
by construction of ! we have ! (V nS) = 1   q, thus ! (V nS)  1 q
p
. Moreover,
1  q > q and p > 2q, thus ! (V nS) = 1  q > q
p
, establishing ! (V nS) 2 ( q
p
; 1 q
p
].
By denition of O , we have p:! (S)  q, thus ! (S)  qp < 12 implying ! (V nS) 
1   q
p
> 1
2
> q
p
. Again by denition of O , we have p:! (V nS)  1   q. Thus
! (V nS) 2 ( q
p
; 1 q
p
]. Now let O be empty. By positive prejudice, 9K 2 W such
that V nK 2 W . Thus !(K) = 12 2 [ qp ; 1 qp ], by the choice of p. Writing  = (!; p),
we complete the proof by showing that the (; q) majority rule  ;qV coincides with
 V . To see this, take any t 2 TV . If  (t) = 1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 W 
and ! (K) 2 f1
2
; 1   q; 1g. Moreover, p > 2q. Thus, p:! (K) > q, establishing
 ;qV (t) = 1. If  (t) = 0, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 O and ! (K) = q, hence
! (V nK) = 1  q. Thus, neither p:! (K) > q, nor p:! (V nK) > 1  q holds, which
establishes  ;qV (t) = 0. If  (t) =  1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 L and
! (K) = 0, hence ! (V nK) = 1 implying p:! (V nK) = p > 1  q, which establishes
 ;qV (t) =  1.
Theorem 7 Given any V ( N , a perception function  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g
satises weak non-imposedness, monotonicity and negative prejudice i¤  V is a
subjective (; q) majority rule with q 2 (1
2
; 1) while  = (!; p) is a weight distrib-
ution such that p > max f2q; 1  qg and ! (K) 2 [1 q
p
; q
p
] for some K 2 2V .13
13Note that p > max f2q; 1  qg ensures qp , 1 qp 2 (0; 1). Moreover, q 2 ( 12 ; 1) ensures 1 qp < qp .
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Proof. To see the ifpart, let  V be a subjective (; q) majority rule as in the
statement of the theorem. It is straightforward to check  ;qV satises weak non-
imposedness and monotonicity. To show that  ;qV satises negative prejudice, take
some K 2 2V with ! (K) 2 (1 q
p
; q
p
]. So  ;qV (t) =  1 for t 2 TV with ti =  1
8i 2 K and ti = 1 8i 2 V nK. Moreover, as p:! (K)  q, we have  ;qV ( t) 2
f 1; 0g. Now take any t 2 TV with  ;qV (t) 2 f0; 1g and let K = fi 2 V : ti = 1g.
If  ;qV (t) = 1 then p:! (K) > q > 1   q, implying  V ( t) =  1. If  ;qV (t) = 0
then p:! (V nK)  1   q. As p > 2q and q > 1   q, we have p > 2(1   q). So
! (V nK) < 1
2
, thus ! (K) > 1
2
and p:! (K) > 1   q, implying  V ( t) =  1
which shows that  ;qV satises negative prejudice. To see the only if part, take
any  V : TV ! f1; 0; 1g that satises weak non-imposedness, monotonicity and
negative prejudice. We dene W , O and L as in Theorem 5. Note that ; 2 L .
Moreover, while one ofW and O may be empty,W [O is non-empty. Now pick
some q 2 (1
2
; 1) and consider the function ! : 2V ! [0; 1] dened for each K 2 2V
as ! (K) = ! (V nK) = 1
2
when K, V nK 2 L ; ! (K) = 0 and ! (V nK) = 1 when
K 2 L and V nK 2 W ; ! (K) = q and ! (V nK) = 1   q when K 2 O and
V nK 2 L . Note that negative prejudice ensures K 2 W [ O =) V nK 2 L 
for each K 2 2V . Thus !(K) + !(V nK) = 1 8K 2 2V with !(V ) = 1, while the
monotonicity of  V implies !(K)  !(L) for all K;L 2 2V withK  L. Thus, any
p 2 [0; 1] induces a subjective weight distribution (!; p). Take any p 2 [0; 1] with
p > maxf2q; 1  qg. We will show that ! (K) 2 [1 q
p
; q
p
] for some K 2 2V . Recall
that W [ O is non-empty. First let O be non-empty and take some S 2 O .
By construction of ! we have ! (S) = q, thus ! (S)  q
p
. Moreover, q > 1   q
and p > 2(1  q), thus ! (S) = q > 1 q
p
, establishing ! (S) 2 (1 q
p
; q
p
]. Now let O 
be empty. By negative prejudice, 9K 2 L such that V nK 2 L . Thus !(K) =
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1
2
2 [1 q
p
; q
p
], by the construction of ! and the choice of p. Writing  = (!; p), we
complete the proof by showing that the (; q) majority rule  ;qV coincides with  V .
To see this, take any t 2 TV . If  (t) = 1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 W and
! (K) = 1, implying p:! (K) = p > q, which establishes  ;qV (t) = 1. If  (t) = 0,
then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 O and ! (K) = q, hence ! (V nK) = 1   q. Thus,
neither p:! (K) > q, nor p:! (V nK) > 1   q holds, which establishes  ;qV (t) = 0.
If  (t) =  1, then K = fi 2 N : ti = 1g 2 L and ! (K) 2 f0; 1   q; 12g, hence
! (V nK) 2 f1
2
; q; 1g. As p > 2q, p:! (V nK) > q > 1 q, establishing  ;qV (t) =  1.
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3 Conclusion
3.1 Discussion
The contribution of the of this work can be thought as axiomatization of the
ongoing research in the eld of stereotypes. One of the important features of
the model we present is that it distinguishes between the subjective opinion of the
observer on how much representative the subgroups of a society is and the possible
prejudice one might have. At rst glance it may sound as an ex ante prejudice
to assign more representativeness to a subgroup with respect to another subgroup
with the same number of members within. However, the prejudice, we suggest,
does not lie in the representativeness of a subgroup. Instead one can nd it in
the outcome of the perception when the same subgroup completely changes their
traits and when that prole is aggregated.
Second interesting result in our interpretation of stereotypes is that it allows,
under imperfect observation, hesitation of the observer to bring a global judgment
over the society. One might argue that in such a case where there is so few
information about the society, the prejudice of the observer may not hold. We
think, however, that the prejudice of an observer is trivial in such a scenario.
Nevertheless the lack of information about the society does not change the nature
of the perception function of an observer. It is true that the prejudice reveals
itself when there is enough information about the society. Yet, the subjective
majority rule is still the same and it reveals the prejudice as long as the visible set
is representative enough formally speaking when our parameter p is large enough.
It is also worth to note that this parameter p is inversely proportional to prudence
of the observer. As we have shown in the previous chapter when p = 1 our model
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of imperfect observation becomes exactly the same as perfect observation. So the
essence of stereotyping is also encaptured in the prudence of the observer as it is
almost impossible for one to form an ethnic stereotype under perfect observation
unless the society is composed of only a bunch of individuals or is about to extinct.
Another way of making benet of the works in stereotyping is to understand
possible perception of immigrants14 by the natives in a country. In such a case
the visible set (V ) is obviously those who immigrated and hence, united with their
citizens in their home country they constitute a certain xed set of individuals (N).
The problem of stereotyping here turns into one of an imperfect observation we
mentioned in our worked. Furthermore it is important to underline that not only
the weight (representativeness) of the coalitions of immigrants are crucial here but
also the prudence of the natives who observe the immigrants from a country and
bring an overall judgement over the whole individuals of the country.
3.2 Further Extensions
The model we propose in this work can be extended to various forms. One par-
ticular way of future research can be analyzing the behaviour of perceptions via
a sequence of observation i.e. the observer meets with members of the society in a
particular sequence and updates his stereotype. This would be interesting in two
aspects. One of them is that this approach would involve a dynamic setting and
hence would allow the observer to adjust her stereotype, second aspect is that
although the trait vector of the society is xed, the order -sequence- that the
individuals are observed would probably matter in terms of stereotype outcome.
14I would ,here, particularly thank to Nicholas Baigent for his comments and examples about
perception and stereotyping over immigrants.
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This encaptures a wider explanation for stereotypes. Through this approach, the
learning literature can also be encaptured in the picture. This entails the essence
of stereotyping by experiencing.
Another extension of our model could be analyzing the traits. From the very
beginning we assumed the e¤ect of the trait intangible so as to say "what the trait
is" did not really matter. Yet, in various scenarios the meaning of the trait could
matter. Although this could violate the trait neutrality, it is already violated in
many real life scenarios.
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